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K. V. Balasubramaniam of Indian Im-
munologicals Ltd. describes their motiva-
tion to develop one of the largest vaccine
delivery franchises in the world, with over
3,000 locations across India:
There’s an inadequate or poor supply of free
vaccines in the public health system, and we
don’t have universal credibility of the cold
chain…so the poorer class near the poverty
line has to go and stand in a queue to get
the vaccine, to immunize their children. We
wanted to bridge that gap. Give the quality,
maintain cold chain, affordability, and
proper availability throughout the country
with a network of qualified people.
…We deal with infrastructure that already
exists because otherwise we cannot deal
with rural costs. It won’t be affordable
anymore.
—K. V. Balasubramaniam, Managing
Director, Indian Immunologicals Ltd.
Introduction
Roughly 55,000 people worldwide are
estimated to die from rabies each year, the
majority bitten by unvaccinated stray dogs
[1]. In India, on average every two seconds
a person is bitten, and every 30 minutes a
person dies of rabies [2]. India’s National
Multicentric Rabies Survey, conducted in
2004 in collaboration with the World
Health Organization (WHO), estimated
rabies mortality at 20,565 deaths per year;
79% of rabies victims did not receive
vaccine treatment [3,4].
Indian Immunologicals Ltd. (IIL) has
contributed to rabies vaccination in India
by developing a low-cost rabies vaccine, a
national franchise distribution network of
3,000 clinics, and social awareness strate-
gies. IIL has grown into the largest
domestic supplier of rabies vaccine, and
is now expanding its strategy to other
Asian countries.
This paper discusses social, cultural, and
economic factors in the development of
IIL’s rabies vaccine and its distribution
system, which will be relevant to readers
interested in the development and distri-
bution of treatments for neglected tropical
diseases (NTDs). While numerous health
delivery franchises have been established
in the developing world [5], IIL is to our
knowledge one of the largest health
delivery franchises for vaccination against
an NTD in the world.
Our analysis of IIL’s approach draws on a
detailed case study conducted between 2005
and 2009, which included semi-structured
interviews with key informants, site visits in
India, and literature analysis. We conducted
interviews with written informed consent
with approximately two dozen physicians,
franchisors, and IIL personnel. Interviews
ranged from 20 minutes to over an hour in
length, and all interviews were transcribed
and subsequently analyzed. We also ana-
lyzed annual reports, background docu-
ments from the peer-reviewed literature,
news reports, books, government and non-
governmental organization reports, and
Web sites.Representatives of IIL were asked
to fact-check the case study; the analysis and
interpretation is our own. All quotes are
from the interviews unless otherwise noted.
The case study was approved by the Office
of Research Ethics of the University of
Toronto.
How Was an Affordable Rabies
Vaccine Developed?
For decades, only nerve tissue rabies
vaccine—derived from a sheep or goat—
was available in India [2,3]. Numerous
studies showed that severe allergic enceph-
alomyelitis was a possible side effect of the
vaccine; however, it was the only afford-
able option for many developing world
populations [6]. The safer and more
effective alternative was tissue culture
vaccine, endorsed by WHO in the early
2000s as the preferred option [7]. The
Indian government discontinued the use of
nerve tissue rabies vaccine in 2005 [2,3],
though its occasional availability has still
been observed [8].
While tissue culture vaccine options
such as Novartis’s Rabipur existed in India
for high-income populations who could
afford to pay, there was a need to develop
an option affordable for lower-income
communities [7]. Countries such as Thai-
land had shown trends of declining rabies
mortality after making available an afford-
able vero cell vaccine utilizing the intra-
dermal route [2,7].
In 1999, the Indian government enlisted
IIL to produce a domestic rabies vaccine
as part of a larger initiative to domestically
develop vaccines against communicable
diseases [9]. At the time, IIL specialized in
veterinary biologicals. The company was
established in 1983 as a wholly owned
subsidiary of the public sector National
Dairy Development Board of India
(NDDB) to support farmers with afford-
able vaccines. In 1997 and 1998, the
company received WHO-GMP and ISO-
9001 certification.
As a public–private entity, IIL has a
socially oriented charter and a mission of
‘‘immunity made affordable,’’ which trans-
lates into a ‘‘double bottom line’’ ap-
proach that values both financial and
social returns [10,11]. This gave IIL the
freedom to pursue development of a low-
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this was IIL’s first foray into human
vaccines, the company launched an inde-
pendent arm called Human Biologicals.
The vaccine was intentionally produced
in-house, explained Dr. K. A. Reddy, IIL
Chief General Manager: ‘‘A slight delay
may be there in the introduction of the
product, but we get the technology at a
lower price, and as we are going to keep
the margins very low, that is going to give
us an edge over others to keep our product
affordable.’’ IIL developed the Abhayrab
vaccine in two years, with a budget of
US$2.5 million.
How Can a Franchise Model
Deliver Vaccines from ‘‘Lab to
Village’’?
By 2001, Abhayrab was approved, after
studies done at government facilities. In a
subsequent independent study conducted
in 2003 by the National Institute for
Communicable Diseases, the vaccine was
confirmed to be safe and immunogenic
[12].
IIL then tackled the challenge of deliv-
ering the vaccine affordably. The vaccine’s
requirement of cold storage, compounded
by electricity outages [13] and a five-dose
treatment protocol [14], represented sub-
stantial delivery challenges.
The majority of IIL’s rabies vaccine
sales were and still are to the Indian
government for use by public hospitals and
institutions (see Table 1). However,
through a research study, IIL found that
when public hospitals were out of stock,
patients were sent to retail pharmacies
where they often could not afford the first
dose. Further, many were unaware of
rabies treatment options, reverting to
counterfeit medication or traditional prac-
tices [15].
These findings helped develop a fran-
chise model combining consultation and
rabies treatment by targeting physicians in
semi-urban and rural areas. The Abhay
Clinic was designed to use existing social
capital in the form of reputable physicians,
leveraging these physicians’ office facilities
and networks to increase affordability and
trust. Support would include educational
opportunities, logistics, and marketing
initiatives from IIL. In effect, IIL would
distribute rabies vaccine in two ways: to
the Indian government, and complemen-
tarily to the public via an innovative
distribution network that we now focus on.
According to the franchise agreement,
doctors were required to attend continuing
medical education (CME) sessions on
animal bite wound treatment and follow-
up care, and to maintain proper cold
chain. IIL was in turn obligated to pay for
these CME sessions, and to maintain cold
chain of vaccines until point of delivery to
the clinic. The standard of care expected
of franchisees was to provide rabies
immune globulin for category III bites; it
was provided to franchisees at a price
point similar to that of the vaccine.
However, it was reported that the addi-
tional patient cost caused some patients to
seek out other doctors who simply gave
them the vaccine without rabies immune
globulin; franchisee doctors noted this as a
point for future public awareness efforts to
focus on.
IIL faced difficulty in finding doctors
who were both respected within the
community and medical profession, and
agreeable to only stocking the Abhayrab
rabies vaccine. Since profit margins were
low, IIL sought socially minded physicians
committed to rabies control and eradica-
tion: ‘‘When we go and discuss with a
franchisee the opening of an Abhay Clinic,
we very clearly tell him that it’s not a very
great business—if he wants to do business,
he should set up a diagnostic laboratory or
make a big nursing home…here he feels
he can have more control over vaccina-
tion. He doesn’t unnecessarily need to
send the patient to the retailers,’’ said
Santanu Pal Roy, IIL’s Marketing Man-
ager.
According to IIL’s management, it took
two years to identify the first 500 franchi-
sees. Many were initially apprehensive,
and unsure of the benefits of joining a
franchise. To encourage enrollment, IIL
designed its model to eliminate up-front
costs to physicians, and provided franchi-
sees with a refrigerator to maintain cold
storage of the vaccine, 30 Abhayrab doses,
testing equipment, signage, CME, and
social marketing. This cost IIL an estimat-
ed Indian rupees (Rs.) 15,000 per franchi-
see, which would be made back over time.
Nevertheless, the right physicians were not
always chosen; roughly 10% left or were
let go due to behaviors such as stocking
rival vaccines in violation of the franchise
agreement.
Doctors were sold the vaccine for Rs.
170, and were required to sell it to patients
for at most Rs. 220. To meet its mission of
‘‘immunity made affordable’’ while staying
economically viable, IIL indicated that it
settled for a 15% profit margin to support
growth and R&D. Mr. Balasubramaniam
claims that ‘‘…as an organization, profit
maximization is not our motive, but
service maximization is, and we also have
defined what is a reasonable return on
investments.’’
How Were Access Challenges
Tackled?
Key requirements to overcoming barri-
ers to accessing health technologies in
poor countries have been identified as
architecture, availability, affordability, and
adoption [16]. Our analysis shows that IIL
used social, cultural, and economic factors
to meet these requirements.
Its ‘‘architecture’’ combined a public-
sector ethos with private-sector efficien-
cies, giving it latitude to pursue social
along with financial imperatives. Howev-
er, IIL’s public ownership might be
difficult to replicate in translating the
model elsewhere.
By managing both vaccine manufactur-
ing and delivery, IIL eliminated interme-
diaries in the distribution process, which
allowed cost reduction, better supply
management, and control over the cold
chain. This made the vaccine more
‘‘available’’. A recent study investigating
an oral polio vaccine’s cold chain in a
rural district of India documented eight
levels of storage before reaching the end
Table 1. Rabies vaccine sales from 2005 to 2009.
Customer Segment 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009
Indian government 0.92 1.15 2.39 2.77 3.32
Abhay Clinic 0.38 0.57 0.74 0.72 0.73
Abhay Shoppe 0 0.01 0.14 0.39 0.28
Total 1.30 1.73 3.27 3.88 4.33
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000946.t001
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[13]. In 2009, the company reported a
field staff of 120, each managing the
supply of 30 physicians.
Our analysis showed that IIL’s ownership
structure, low profit margins, and franchis-
ing with physicians contributed to making its
vaccine ‘‘affordable’’. As of 2010, the rabies
vaccine was reportedly priced approximate-
ly 10% to 30% lower than leading compet-
ing vaccines such as Rabipur and Verorab.
When physician fees are included, the
difference becomes 20% to 40%—a signif-
i c a n ta m o u n tf o rl o w e r - i n c o m eI n d i a n si n
affordability and in motivating completion
of proper vaccination treatment. While
pricing is public, detailed analysis of propri-
etary financial data would be required to
reveal the extent to which lower pricing was
assisted by IIL’s animal health parent
enterprise.
Lastly, IIL’s understanding of the social
factors of rabies has driven ‘‘adoption.’’ Its
social marketing campaigns in partnership
with schools and community health work-
ers contributed to changing behaviors such
as applying chilies, salt, turmeric powder,
or lime to clean dog bite wounds [17].
Abhay Clinic doctors were educated on
rabies care through sessions on infiltration
techniques and rabies immune globulin
administration and risks. Franchisees were
provided with equipment to perform anti-
body titer testing, to demonstrate vaccine
efficacy. A cause-effect relationship be-
tween these interventions and rabies mor-
talityisdifficulttoestablish,buttheseefforts
are likely contributing to increased appro-
priate rabies care.
By overcoming vaccine distribution
challenges, IIL delivered over 4 million
(M) rabies doses through its distribution
channels in 2009, including the Indian
government (3.32 M doses), Abhay Clinics
(0.73 M doses), and Abhay Shoppes
(0.28 M doses). (See Table 1 for 5 years
of data.) Revenues from the vaccine were
Rs. 843 M in the 2009 reporting year, up
from Rs. 636 M the previous year; see
[10,11] for further financial data.
How Is Indian Immunologicals
Evolving Its Approach?
Since building its Abhay Clinic net-
work, IIL has evolved its approach in three
ways. First, in 2006 it developed ‘‘Abhay
Shoppes’’ for delivery of small quantities of
rabies vaccine to doctors—an ‘‘on-call’’
service aimed at non-franchisee doctors
who did not want to commit exclusively to
IIL’s vaccine. As of 2009, IIL had 300
Abhay Shoppes supplying rabies vaccine
to roughly 100 physicians each. However,
some Shoppe owners have expressed
dissatisfaction with their income and some
Abhay Clinic franchisees are concerned
about encroachment; vaccine delivery
through Shoppes dropped in 2009 from
the previous year.
Second, IIL is replicating its Abhay
model in other countries. Since 2007 in
the Philippines, the model has been
modified to meet local conditions. In
contrast to Abhay Clinics, the Philippines
model involves partnering with govern-
ment facilities, creating adjunct ‘‘Animal
Bite Treatment Centers’’, and charging
patients per (intradermal) shot. This has
helped patients spread cost across several
visits. Expansion to other Asian countries
is under consideration.
Finally, IIL has expanded its human
vaccine line, including AbhayTox for
tetanus, AbhayM for measles, and Abhay-
Tag for diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus.
It has started supplying these to Abhay
Clinics, with plans to transition the
franchises into ‘‘One Stop Vaccination
Centers’’. However, since many vaccines
for these conditions are available for free
at government hospitals, or are adminis-
tered to children by pediatricians [18],
only some general practitioners in IIL’s
network have been receptive to buying the
additional vaccines. The company has also
been collaborating with the non-profit
Program for Appropriate Technology in
Health since 2003, in a multi-partner
initiative to optimize the heat- and
freeze-stability of several types of vaccines
[19].
Conclusion
Our case study reveals that social,
cultural, and economic factors were criti-
cal to IIL’s franchise network reaching its
current scale. Social and cultural factors
included the income and geographical
distribution of its target population; rabies
awareness in both adults and children;
community-based reputation of physi-
cians; and incentives for franchisees.
Economic factors included eliminating
middlemen for both cost savings and
improved cold chain maintenance; lever-
aging existing physician infrastructure to
reduce distribution network expenses;
minimizing up-front payments for fran-
chising physicians; tapping previous ani-
mal vaccine development expertise; and
an unusual public–private ownership
structure that has led to a focus on social
impact along with profits.
While the Abhay approach has demon-
strably scaled across India, its health
impact to date is difficult to quantify, and
this is an area for future research.
Ultimately, the eradication of rabies re-
quires controlling the spread within ani-
mals, and further educating patients [20].
IIL has built one of the largest NTD
vaccine delivery franchises in the world,
with almost 3,000 locations. This vaccine
delivery and awareness model may hold
lessons for future NTD efforts.
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Learning Points
N Leveraging existing physicians through a franchise model can cut costs to
provide affordable treatment options and speed adoption, especially when the
physicians selected are trusted community leaders.
N Programs to educate the community and develop trust can be effective social
and cultural components of large-scale health care delivery strategies.
N Publicly owned organizations with private-sector efficiencies can combine the
best of both worlds by manufacturing and delivering neglected disease
treatments and complementing strained public health care systems. The
ownership structure of IIL has the flexibility to consider social factors in
decision-making.
N Development of health solutions by organizations based in developing
countries can have significant advantages—including commitment and ability
to create affordable products, physical proximity to the market, and
appreciation of cultural nuances and end-user behavior.
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